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Prior to and following WW II a loose movement within Dutch psychology, led by F. Buytendijk, eventually solidified as a nascent phenomenological psychology.  Supported by German, Belgian and French colleagues, Dutch phenomenological psychologists and criminologists attempted to generate an understanding of psychology that was based on largely Husserlian interpretations of phenomenological philosophy. This movement came to a halt in the 1960s even though it was exported to North America and elsewhere as “phenomenological psychology.”  Frequently referred to as the ‘Utrecht School,’ most of the activity of the group was centered at Utrecht University although it was less a school than a group of loosely affiliated individuals.  In this article we examine the role played by Johannes Linschoten in both aspects of the development of a phenomenological psychology; its rise in North America and Europe, and its institutional demise.  By the time of his early death in 1964, Linschoten had cast considerable doubt on the possibilities of a purely phenomenological psychology. Nonetheless, his empirical work, especially his 1956 dissertation published in German, can be seen to be a form of empiricism that was inspired by phenomenology but that clearly distanced itself from the more elitist and esoteric aspects of Dutch phenomenological psychology.


Introduction: Phenomenological Psychology and the Utrecht School
The Netherlands occupies a unique place in the history of phenomenological psychology.  Although in the English literature there was clearly some interest in phenomenologically oriented approaches to psychology during the 1950s, much of this literature  consisted of translations or commentary on the work of European thinkers (Binswanger, 1941; Buytendijk, 1950, 1953; Duncker, 1947; Gurwitsch, 1955; MacLeod, 1951; McGill, 1947; Plessner, 1964; M. B. Smith, 1950; Snygg, 1941; Van den Berg, 1952; Walker, 1957; Wellek, 1955).  The vast increase of interest occurred in the 1960s and in the 1970s. Ironically, by this time the move towards a phenomenological psychology had already passed in The Netherlands.
Frederick Buytendijk (1887-1974) was largely responsible for the unique expression of phenomenological psychology in Utrecht.  He was appointed in 1946 to replace F.M.J.A. (Frans) Roels who was ousted from his chair for collaborating with the German occupiers.  By this time Buytendijk was already 59 and he was not a psychologist but a physiologist and physician.  An autodidact, he had written various books on animal psychology and a book that was later translated into English as “On pain,” written apparently while he was held hostage by the German occupiers along with other well known intellectuals and leaders (Spiegelberg, 1965).  Several others were also important in founding the Utrecht School.  Among these were Martinus Langeveld, an educationalist who was at Utrecht and helped get Buytendijk appointed in the first place (Dehue, 1995; Schenk, 1982). Another member of the school was David J. van Lennep who had trained in theology in the 1920s and who after nearly 20 years in psychological practice received his Ph.D. in 1948 from Henricus Cornelius Rümke, the psychiatrist (Van Lennep, 1948). Van Lennep had established the “Stichting voor Psychotechniek” (Foundation for Psychotechnique) in Utrecht in 1927 as an organization for personnel selection and vocational advice.  As Dehue (1995) has noted, his appointment in Utrecht in 1949 was controversial among the Utrecht faculty board, largely because he had spent so much time in the commercially successful Foundation for Psychotechnique.  It was only with the support of the Minister of Education, Art and Sciences that Van Lennep’s appointment was upheld.  Buytendijk, who had easy access to the Minister, apparently urged the Minister to speed up the appointment (Schenk, 1982). 
Those most closely associated with a ‘school of phenomenology’ in Utrecht were the jurist Willem Pompe and criminologist G.Th. (Gerard) Kempe, the psychiatrists H.C. Rümke and J.H. Van den Berg, and the sociologist J.P. Kruijt. Along with Johannes Linschoten and Benjamin Kouwer (representing the younger generation of psychologists) Buytendijk, Langeveld and Van Lennep set out to do psychology in a deliberately different fashion from the natural scientific or positivist standpoint.  The Utrecht school defined itself in relation to the traditions of philosophical phenomenology in Germany such as those of Edmund Husserl (the famous “founder” of phenomenology as a philosophical approach), Karl Jaspers (the phenomologically oriented psychiatrist) and Max Scheler (the Catholic philosopher who emphasized personalism in phenomenology), and the existentialists in France such as Jean Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel and Simone de Beauvoir.  However, philosophical phenomenology is not a phenomenological psychology. In this respect the Utrecht school was vague, nor was there a single or clear phenomenological research program.  In fact, as we have pointed out elsewhere (Van Hezewijk, Stam, & Panhuysen, 2002), the Utrecht School was something of a label for those outside, but not those inside the school.  Given the divergent disciplines in which the phenomenologists were engaged and their informal contacts, the idea of a school seems far-fetched.  Indeed, from his correspondence it appears that Linschoten made various attempts to gather together a circle of well known phenomenologists from The Netherlands and Belgium during the mid-1950s without much success.  Nonetheless, it is the case that during the 1950s and 1960s there was a unique concentration of scholars, interested in bringing German and French phenomenology and existentialism into the social sciences that was centered on Utrecht.  And they did publish one book together, a 1953 publication entitled “Person and World” to which only individuals in Utrecht contributed (Van den Berg & Linschoten, 1953).  This too would have reinforced the reputation of the Utrecht School from the outside, particularly in the way that many, including Linschoten initially, were critical of positivist psychology in that work.​[1]​ 
In this article we want to outline Linschoten’s position wherein he develops his unique contribution to psychology.  In particular, we will argue that, from the early 1950s, when he is identified as a member of the Utrecht School and writes a number of phenomenological papers, until his 1964 book, he promulgates a number of positions on psychological issues that are much less discontinuous than is frequently thought.  At the same time, Linschoten’s own outspokenness and increasingly critical voice added to the perception that he had undergone a kind of conversion. However, we will argue that a selective reading of his work contributed to these different perceptions of his position. This may have had to do with the fact that he published widely and in three languages, Dutch, German and English, and given the divergent audiences who were reading him, including phenomenological and experimental psychologists, few people were aware of his entire oeuvre.  While the actual misperceptions of his work may have been largely of Dutch interest, Linschoten’s research career clearly reflects the promise and limits of a certain conception of phenomenological psychology in mid-twentieth century psychology.
For all the discussion of the ‘Utrecht School,’ Linschoten himself never spoke of a school but only of a laboratory in which he conducted his work. This distinction is important, for the notion of a school that is centered around a person or idea, is associated with the relationship of a master to pupils and followers.  A lab on the other hand connotes a place in which certain tasks need to be carried out by scientists working together in a cooperative fashion.  Designation of a ‘school’ in the sciences is something that gradually disappeared in the 19th century. 
Linschoten’s early life and work
Johannes Linschoten (1925-1964) is considered by many Dutch psychologists to be a key figure of modern Dutch psychology.  His reputation was cemented in the Netherlands largely through the posthumous publication, in 1964, of his book Idolen van de Psycholoog (Idols of the psychologist; (Linschoten, 1964).  In this version of his story Linschoten has been described as a modern Saul who suddenly saw the light on his way to Damascus and continued as Paul (Breeuwsma, 1994).​[2]​  His reputation was enhanced by the fact that Linschoten died at the age of 38, while working in his laboratory in Utrecht, on March 17, 1964, just before Idols of the psychologist (hereafter Idolen) was published.  According to a poll of Dutch psychologists published in 1992 (De Ridder, 1992), this book was seen as the most important Dutch book in the psychology literature of The Netherlands in the past 100 years. And consequently, for Dutch psychologists Linschoten is often characterized as the savior of Dutch psychology from the morass of phenomenology (for general histories of this period in Dutch psychology see (Dehue, 1995; Derksen, 1997a, 1997b; Terwee, 1990; Van Strien, 1993). 
Paradoxically, this view of Linschoten does not match his reputation outside The Netherlands.  For a period of several decades North American psychologists and phenomenological philosophers saw Linschoten as an important figure in promulgating a rigorous version of phenomenological psychology (Giorgi, 1970a; Kockelmans, 1987; Misiak & Sexton, 1973). This was aided by a translation of a volume on William James (Linschoten, 1968) and a visit to Duquesne University in 1961.  His seemingly radical change of position in the 1960s has never been fully understood outside (or even inside) of the Netherlands.​[3]​ 
In The Netherlands Linschoten is largely remembered for his 1964 book, one that  was never translated into any other language despite the fact that his previous book on William James (Linschoten, 1959) was indeed translated into German (Linschoten, 1961b) as well as English (Linschoten, 1968), and despite the fact that his Dutch publisher and his widow had several advanced contacts with English and American publishers. What new and important developments were reported in this book? Why was it so important in Dutch psychology while it had apparently no impact anywhere else in the world?  In Idolen Linschoten was primarily addressing students since the book originated in lectures given between 1959 and 1964. Later it was used in advanced psychology courses at various universities till into the eighties.  It appeared at a crucial moment in Dutch university expansion.  The number of students in psychology went from several hundred in 1945 to 1600 by 1960.  Each of the six universities increased their psychologists from one chair in psychology in 1945, to at least five professorships in various sub disciplines of psychology by 1960  (Van Strien, 1993). The discipline was growing as were the universities and various fields of applied psychology, such as the new fields of organizational psychology and clinical psychology.  These were drawing students in ever-greater numbers.  As Van Strien said of this period, “psychology had become a fashionable subject” (Van Strien, 1993, p.102 ). And, of course, the 1960s were, in general, a time of rapid social and political change, also in the Netherlands.
The situation in Utrecht was not much different (Van Hezewijk, 2005). Utrecht granted the first psychology doctorate in the Netherlands (earlier psychology was a specialty in philosophy) in the 1930s. From WWII on, the psychology department had grown exponentially. Phenomenology was taught but in their careers students could not generate much profit from their phenomenological education. They seemed to lack the more technical aspects of doing psychology (like testing and statistics). This may also have to do with the relatively many non-psychologists occupying psychology chairs in Utrecht: Buytendijk, Van Lennep and Langeveld all came from different fields. 
Linschoten’s book (Linschoten, 1964) has, in time, come to be seen as a major turning point, a break between the phenomenological psychology in which Linschoten was schooled and to which he contributed and the experimental psychology that he practiced and wrote about in his book Idolen.  Linschoten completed his Ph.D. thesis under Frederick Buytendijk and upon the latter’s retirement in 1957 was appointed to Buytendijk’s chair in psychology.  He had been clearly designated as the heir apparent to the phenomenological psychology practiced in Utrecht.  However, Buytendijk’s retirement is now considered, in retrospect, as the beginning of the end of what was called the ‘Utrecht School’, that loose coalition of phenomenologically oriented thinkers largely centered at the Utrecht University but also found in such disciplines as psychiatry, psychology, pedagogy, and criminology.
Linschoten’s early development as phenomenologist
At the outset of World War II Linschoten’s family was in Indonesia where his father was a history teacher in colonial schools.  After the Japanese invasion, the family was split up and interned in camps where Linschoten’s father subsequently died.  After his release from the camp in Indonesia, Linschoten returned to the Netherlands and completed his secondary school studies. In 1946 he entered Utrecht University and quickly fell under Buytendijk’s tutelage.  Having converted to Catholicism as well​[4]​ he initially followed Buytendijk in his phenomenological orientation to psychology.  As an apparently brilliant student he had accepted Buytendijk’s views on psychology and in his early work Linschoten presented these views in a decisive manner.
Linschoten’s most supportive statements on the nature and importance of phenomenological psychology were written during the early 1950s.  For example, in his afterword to Person and World (Van den Berg & Linschoten, 1953) he wrote,  
Phenomenological psychology takes a critical stance towards a natural science of psychology.  Indeed, she rejects every objective, positivistic, natural science interpretation of the human life of the soul.  She understands that much will make her different from other psychologies, but recognizes with pleasure that in one sense she is bound to them, is even identical, namely in her original question.  Every psychology asks about the person …. the question is one and the same….it specifies the ethos of psychology and guarantees the unity of all psychological systems.  To understand the person as he is - he is not in totality, he becomes continually in his history as a person, together with his world from which we come to know him.  This is where the phenomenological psychology wants to meet him: on common ground [vertrouwd domein] (1953, p. 253).
Note that the critique of psychology is limited by an acknowledgement of the common question that supports all forms of psychology.  Hence, even at his most critical, Linschoten is careful to seek out commonalities and to search for connections to traditional psychologies.  No one who had read Linschoten’s substantial chapter length contribution to a post-war introductory psychology text (154 pages) could have been surprised by this (Linschoten, 1961a). The chapter, on Functieleer or the general experimental psychology of sensory and memory processes, is in many respects an up to date analysis of the psychology of the day.  In his introductory remarks to this chapter Linschoten carefully differentiates this functional approach from the psychology of the person.  Functions are the commerce or intercourse of the person with the data of the personal behavioral field.  And since there is no ‘empty’ exercise of the sensory functions, this fusion of functions to their objects is intentionality.  This is the “connection of person and world” where “the person is the active element, the carrier or origin of the function, the situation as the motivation or relational-system, or behavioral field.”  (pp. 54-55).  The person and situation form an ensemble [samenspel] (p. 58).  The version of general sensory and memory psychology that Linschoten develops is very sympathetic to a natural science of psychology, even though it carefully returns the processes under investigation to the individual actor; it is not a positivistic psychology as much as it is a Gestalt Psychology, an attempt to find the roots of human perception and motor activities.  
Linschoten’s writings in the 1950s are not consistent in these matters and we don’t wish to force consistency where there is none. Sometimes he writes as a phenomenologist, as for example, when he declares in 1956 that the understanding of psychology is determined by intentionality.  By this he meant that phenomenological psychology was meant to “explicate general, intentional structure of the specific different ways in which the person explains his world, structures that find their unity in the foundations of intentionality” (Linschoten, 1953, p. 252). In the same year he wrote his doctoral dissertation, a massive work on the nature of depth-perception (discussed below) that makes no mention of this phenomenological perspective but, instead, focuses on the perceptual research of the problem at hand. We will discuss his phenomenological work in the first instance and then discuss the dissertation and the later book on William James.  What is clear from this time-line is that he gradually comes to see psychology as an empirical enterprise and not a discipline whose place it is to work out the historical, intentional nature of human life.
In 1954, Linschoten wrote a paper that was one of his first discussions on the nature of phenomenological psychology.  He carefully focuses not just on Husserl but brings Merleau-Ponty to bear on the question of what a phenomenological psychology can be.  First, every human act finds its sense outside itself, is always tied to the human landscape.  Second, human beings are not only worldly they are embodied; the body is the medium of human activity.  Third, phenomenological psychology is concerned with communication, not least because human activity is thoroughly infused with sociality. In this sense phenomenological psychology is also a social psychology of the person. Fourth, human beings are historical beings that develop towards a telos.  His fifth and final point is that human activity is bound by freedom.  This is not an abstract free will but an understanding of activities as motivated, as normative yet evitable at will.  Phenomenological psychology seeks to address the ethical character of all activity.  All in all, Linschoten already tries to express the idea that the proof of the pudding for psychology is in the results of experiments and explanations of, e.g., depth perception effects. In other words: if explaining and experimenting does not elucidate or doesn’t fit in with the basic experiences a perceiving person has (with all his other background, from physiological to ethical) the result must be rejected or at least questioned. Unfortunately, he calls this foundational: we think it is more a critical role that phenomenal experiences play, rather than foundational. This also is in line with the somewhat confusing approach in Linschoten’s experiments that seem to have a more demonstrative role than present-day experiments have. However, Linschoten seems to think that when the theory predicts that the perceiver should have a certain experience in an experiment that he or she doesn’t have, then the theory fails. The important thing is that especially in perception experiments the obtained or aimed effect can be phenomenally experienced.    
Acknowledging Husserl as the originator of this phenomenological psychology, Linschoten seeks to avoid Heidegger and Binswanger although he must have known the work of both.  It is not clear what his objections were but it should be noted that his version of an integrated psychology could not have been integrated in a Heideggerian framework.  He is also explicit in his refusal to differentiate phenomenological psychology from a general or ‘positivistic psychology.’  Here he claims “that phenomenological psychology would reject the experiment as method is based on a myth. She asks only after sense and meaning, not just numbers”  (1954, p.9).  This is not surprising; at roughly the same time, Linschoten was also deeply involved in conducting his research for his dissertation on binocular depth perception that we will discuss more fully in the next section.​[5]​ 
In his early work (Linschoten, 1950) Linschoten argues that before one can develop a theory on the perception of movement, and before one can safely experiment with movement phenomena, there should be agreement on the different phenomena of movement (can they be analyzed using one term “movement”?) and on the fundamental meaning of movement. He develops a phenomenological analysis to show that movement cannot be studied without studying for whom (or to whom) “it moves”.  Although the logical attitude towards analysis leads to opposing world and subject, to separating subjective and objective elements, and to asking questions about truth and certainty, a phenomenological analysis aims at reality and value for a certain subject or organism, aims at understanding movement as something in which subject and object are both involved and are interdependent. This strongly resembles the references in Linschoten’s more explicitly phenomenological writing to the “encounters” between two human beings as the first and foremost task for the psychologist (Linschoten, 1953).
The publication in 1950 (Linschoten, 1950) can be read as critical of “logical analysis” and as a plea for a phenomenological psychology.  It is a thorough phenomenological analysis of movement phenomena, complete with a phenomenological vocabulary although it is unclear if it constitutes a ‘phenomenological psychology’ as such.  It was written in the very year that he started the experiments for his outstanding and comprehensive study of binocularity in depth perception (Linschoten, 1956a). What was to become his Ph.D. thesis includes a theoretical analysis of all available binocular depth perception theories as well as a large number of detailed experiments on theoretical questions that arose during the theoretical study, and that had been conducted in the Utrecht laboratory by himself and a few co-workers. Although this work was only ever published in German, it shows Linschoten as a sophisticated experimentalist. It belongs to the other, less known but not less substantial category of works published by Linschoten. Not only does this category contain the book on depth perception (573 pages plus a booklet with 226 figures, reporting both thorough theoretical analyses as well as reports of 130 experiments on binocular depth perception), it also contains reports on induced movement (Linschoten, 1952), in which experimental work and phenomenological interpretation go hand in hand.
Linschoten on binocular depth perception
In virtually all discussions of Linschoten and his impact on phenomenological psychology, the dissertation is entirely ignored although in studying the development of Linschoten’s thought this work (1956a) is crucial. It clearly reflects his position in the early years of his scientific career, at the age of 25 – 30, and demonstrates how mature and elaborate his ideas already were at that age. It also demonstrates the manner in which the relationship between phenomenology and psychology was one of his most central concerns—notwithstanding the changes his ideas about this relationship went through. Furthermore it confirms a repeated theme in his writing, namely, that he thought phenomenology was essential for a non-reductive psychology. Phenomenology both demonstrates that our experiences cannot be reduced to physiological properties or optical laws, and helps to find the purely psychological explanations of things as they are experienced visually. Moreover he demonstrates that phenomenology complements the experimental approach—or perhaps that the experimental method necessarily completes phenomenology. And last but not least, the thesis shows by its very subject matter that phenomenology can be part of a focus on subjects that were thought to be at odds with the phenomenological approach.
Linschoten had unambiguous ideas about what phenomenology actually had to offer psychology. It was perhaps underestimated, even by Buytendijk - his supervisor - how these ideas deviated from those of Buytendijk and the remainder of the ‘Utrecht School’ (we will return to this matter later). The interesting thing about Linschoten’s approach to depth perception is that traditionally it seems to belong to what now often is referred to as experimental psychology—the field of what in The Netherlands is called functieleer and in German was called Funktionslehre, a term introduced by Carl Stumpf. This was already a focus of nineteenth century psychology, influenced, no doubt, by the fact that psychology found its form at that time under the influence of scientists with roots in physiology (Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann von Helmholtz), medicine (Ewald Hering), physics (Helmholtz, Gustave Fechner, Ernst Mach) and the like, focusing on questions raised in philosophy and epistemology by philosophers like René Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, George Berkeley, and Immanuel Kant.
Linschoten’s dissertation has three parts and a postscript on why human beings have two eyes.  The 36 page introduction, in which Linschoten states the general problem of depth perception, concerns the way that the problem traditionally had been (mistakenly) attacked and gives his preliminary remarks about how he will approach the problem.  The introduction also demonstrates the importance of this subject in the context of discussions in the 1950s and the centrality of the questions posed by phenomenologists for the development of psychology. This is illustrated by the fact that there are three main antagonists in Linschoten’s thesis.  The most prominent one is Hering, (1834-1918).  Next is Helmholtz (1821-1894) and somewhat less antagonistic are the Gestalt psychologists. The antagonists represent the approaches that Linschoten viewed as, in essence, reducing the perception of depth to physiological or physical (optical) properties. Linschoten, however, claims the autonomy of psychology (1956, p. 8). Perceiving depth is to experience depth, which he meant in a definite psychological sense. Linschoten rhetorically asks the reader whether “the retinal image, as a stage in the neurophysiological events, should remain unobserved” (“ob nicht vielmehr auch das Netzhautbild, als Stadium im neurophysiologischen Geschehen, ausser betracht bleiben soll…”, 1956, p. 8). And, although at the end of the thesis he acknowledges that optical and physiological properties play a role in the formation of both retinal images, he nevertheless claims that there is only one experienced image.  Therefore, psychologically, depth vision can be studied as the perception of one eye with two members (“zweigliederig”).  He acknowledges that much remains to be discovered about the role of the brain in perception. However, neurological knowledge will never be able to replace psychological knowledge.  A purely psychological approach not only has its value, it is presupposed in any other approach to perceiving depth.  So, neither the physical theory that analyzes the optical properties of the stimulus or stimulus situation, nor the psychophysical theory in which proportions of the physical properties are mathematically related to proportions between experiences within one qualitative dimension, nor the structural relations within the retinal field (cf. Gibson), will be sufficient to explain what happens when a human being perceives the ‘green leaf of yonder tree.’  These theories have their own value but they are not alternatives for the most fundamental approach, an approach in its own right that lies at the base of the questions about the physiological, optical or psychophysical mechanisms.  He argues explicitly that (depth) perception is exclusively a matter of phenomenological method, or even a matter of epistemology.  His phenomenology resembles the Husserlian perspective—although we suspect that at that time most of Husserl’s work still was unknown to Linschoten​[6]​. Husserl had argued in his Philosophie der Arithmetik that the basic laws of logic and mathematics find their most fundamental ground in the experience of the essences of things and relations between things, and saw mathematics as essentially an abstraction of the activity of counting. In Logische Untersuchungen Husserl corrected his position, now claiming autonomy for logic and mathematics (Husserl, 1891, 1900-1901). In essence, physics is about things as experienced, and about relations between things as experienced. 
Linschoten claims something similar:  phenomenology is most fundamentally descriptive of experience and he seems to equate this with psychology.  Thus it appears to be equally relevant for the experience of relations between human beings in the encounter (as is most often regarded as the central claim of the Utrecht School of which Linschoten was then a member) as it is relevant for the experience of relations between “natural things” perceived.  Again, to foreclose the problem of forcing consistency where there may be none, we do not claim that this was a deliberately worked out program of research.  Rather, we see this as a general underlying approach that allowed Linschoten to write phenomenologically oriented papers while conducting research on fundamental perceptual experience.
The claim for an autonomous psychology is based on an anti-Cartesian, non-dualistic stance. That is, only after the experience of, e.g., depth, the dualism of the explanation of seeing things in depth by referring to the internal and external worlds come into existence. And it is only after this experience that the logic and physics, or the physiology and mathematics of spatial perception become possible. The thesis is anti-reductionistic and anti-mechanistic in the first instance. In that sense it seems to contrast with his later work, Idolen (Linschoten, 1964). However, we think it is only a superficial reading of both works that supports this claim. The message from the Linschoten of 1956 is not much different from that in 1964. What is different is the scope and domain of the subject matter. Depth perception is most fundamentally a phenomenological experience. It is not a physical (optical) event, nor is it the result of an “unconscious inference” (Helmholtz’ unbewußter Schlüsse) about a retinal event, let alone a conscious construction. It is not even remotely possible to have a physical, psychophysical, optical or physiological explanation of perceiving depth, without first having had an in depth analysis of what it is to perceive—that is to experience—depth. In fact, Linschoten (in §6 of his introduction) analyzes depth very much as Husserl must have intended when he introduced the so-called eidetic reduction, and as Brentano implied when he pointed to the intentionality of conscious experience. Space lies at the root of depth. Space has a left-right dimension, a front-back dimension and an up-down dimension in experience. Space also has a field structure, and it provides opportunities for objects to have an orientation. Even under the influence of a Ganzfeld (the technical term for “seeing” light through halved table-tennis balls placed over the eye) or when in a field of thick fog one cannot but experience space and objects in depth even when the stimulation is fully equal at all points on the retina. 
Not all phenomena – all things as experienced – can be reduced to optical events.  The ‘spatiality’ and the ‘orientationality’ of things cannot be reduced to optical or physiological properties. Indeed one sees nothing when there is not a thing to be seen; however the thing — whether it is a “thinglike” or “spacelike” thing – will be seen somewhere, in the “openness” of the optical field (1956a, p. 21), as a thing. The spatiality should be understood as an observable—or perhaps it is better to translate it as a “phenomenal” (“anschauliche”)—quality. The forms of this quality are analyzable in terms of the conditions of the optical field they depend on. For instance, one can predict the conditions under which empty space is perceived, when the so-called ‘glass experience’​[7]​ will occur, how smoke and fog will be experienced and when the voluminousity of physical bodies will be perceived. But all of these presuppose the irreducible “Urphenomen” of spatiality. 
After discussing the work on binocular depth perception by Ewald Hering, Johannes Müller, and the modifications of Hering’s and Müller’s theories by Wheatstone, Fechner, Panum, Volkmann, Helmholtz and others, Linschoten included a substantial report of 130 experiments over 300 pages in his thesis. In the experimental division there are five chapters discussing and reporting on experiments on seeing double and the experience of corresponding retinal points; a chapter on the Panum effect​[8]​; the borders of the attraction between an occupied and an unoccupied visual field; the formative moment (“Gestaltungsmoment”) in the spatial organization of the aggregated image (“Sammelbild”); and the relations between eye movements and depth perception. He undertakes the task of testing or retesting all the elements of Hering’s theory of depth perception and its modifications, as well as the relevant preceding experiments. He also discusses relevant experiments conducted earlier by perception researchers, including Gestalt theorists. Of the one hundred and thirty experiments that were conducted and briefly reported, some are modifications or sophisticated versions of earlier experiments conducted by perception researchers. 
In his experimental procedures, Linschoten clearly made use of a basic rule that is still used in psychophysics and such disciplines as linguistics, namely, that in some cases it is relatively unimportant to include more than a few participants in an experiment, although these participants provide multiple data-points.  Linschoten sometimes used a small number of participants (although at other times he reports that 40 persons participated).  The most important reason to invite a larger number of participants is to diminish the effect of individual differences and of individuals intentionally influencing results. This would explain why in some cases n=1 or n≤5 is acceptable.  Whenever there are good reasons to believe that human beings in general do not differ in the way they react or process input, one might as well use one participant as many.  This is the case when there are good arguments to believe that persons cannot influence the outcome of the experiment, and when the outcome will be the same with every normal subject.  It is also in line with the tradition of early German experimentation in psychology (e.g., Wundt), in which an experiment often was a demonstration of an effect, instead of a test of a hypothesis. Of course it is not easy to establish when this is the case, but it is probably reasonable to suggest that the processing of visual stimuli in the periphery of the perceptual system meets these requirements.  The reasonableness, however, always depends on one’s prior theory of the processes involved. 
In the case of Linschoten’s thesis he is not always clear about the number of participants that he used in the experiments to support his claims or refute the claims of others​[9]​.  What counts, is that the readers can check the results of the experimental setup themselves.  The experiments in his thesis are carefully illustrated with hundreds of figures, printed in an accompanying 60 pages booklet.  Even without a stereoscope it is often possible to verify the outcome with the naked eyes.  Hence, as in classical psychophysics, the experiments are continued until the desired effect is achieved – after which the illustrations serve to demonstrate the effect in such a way that any reader can verify the phenomenon.​[10]​
It is important to remember here that Linschoten claimed an autonomous domain for psychology apart from the physiological and sociological domains.  Moreover Linschoten claimed a phenomenological accessibility for the results of the psychological research, even though no influence on the result is possible through suggestion.  For instance in one experiment he unambiguously demonstrates that Hering’s theory is incorrect.  Linschoten designed the illustration in Figure 2 to demonstrate this.  When focusing on an imaginary point in space beyond the figure the effect will be a blurring movement of the right and the left parts of the pictures towards each other (as in Figure 2i represented by the cross and arrows).  Hering’s theory would predict that in the phenomenal figure that results from focusing on an imaginary point beyond the rectangles and lines in Figure 2, i and i’ fuse and that three lines will show: c’, <a,a’>​[11]​  and b (as in Figure 2ii).

INSERT FIGURE 2, 2i, 2ii and 2iii HERE
However, what every one of the forty participants reported and what every participant today still reports, is that <i, i’> have fused and that the other lines have fused in two lines: <a, c’> and <b, a’> on the right of the rectangle (as in Figure 2iii).  No one reports a separate line b.  Note that the space on the right of the rectangle is larger for the left rectangle (i) than it is for (i’).  This implies that neither the law of correspondence is correct, nor the law that states that objects on disparate positions can only fuse when the locations that correspond with each other are disturbed only slightly. This and other complimentary experiments result in Linschoten’s refutation of Hering’s theory as insufficient. 
Linschoten concluded that in general, it is not the properties of the corresponding or disparate points that can explain the phenomena of depth perception, but that one must find them in the Gestalt qualities of the figures themselves. He summarizes this in the proposition that “in the (one) experienced image the (two) seen pictures that represent the left eye and right eye versions of one gestalt, are fused independently of the question whether they are pictured as corresponding or as disparate points” (1956, p. 124).  
The more important conclusion we can draw here is that Linschoten establishes the autonomy of psychological judgment, as phenomenal judgment. Some phenomena cannot be reduced to physiological or optical qualities. Gestalt qualities are one of them. This is not to say that the ‘naïve’ participant is to be believed under any circumstances. He clearly states that only persons that are experienced in optics can draw conclusions about some of the workings of perception. This means that phenomenology enlightened by a knowledge of nature helps the psychologist explain perceptual phenomena.
The 130 experiments and their detailed discussions cannot be relayed here.  They concern, among other things, the quantitative aspects of binocular depth perception, such as boundary conditions of attraction, the minimal dispersion necessary for depth perception, the relation between the degree of dispersion and perceived depth, and so on.  Linschoten also discusses a dynamic theory of depth perception.  After experimentally analyzing the contribution of Gestalt theory, Linschoten shows it to fail in explaining binocular depth perception and its remarkable effects. First, although Gestalt theory denies the ‘point-for-point’ approach of binocular depth perception (the foundation of Hering’s theory), it is still based on the comparison of two monocular Gestalt configurations. “It is as if the elementary processes still have the same configurational properties as the phenomenal Gestalts” [“Man tut als hätten die Elementarvorgänge noch die gleichen konfigurationellen Eigenschaften wie die phenomenalen Gestalten”] (1956a, p. 315). 
Second, Gestalt theory supposes that there is a configurational explanation for the attraction between the disparate elements of the two retinal Gestalts, instead of a dynamic explanation. Gestalt theory explains the fusion of images as an effect of the configurational properties like the Gestalt laws of proximity or resemblance. However, Linschoten shows that the dynamic tendency to fuse is more fundamental than the configurational, and it sometimes even goes against the resemblance or proximity laws of the Gestaltists.  “The tendency to organize the total image with a minimum of conflicting experiences” is more fundamental [Die Tendenz das Sammelbild mit einem Minimum von Wettstreiterscheinungen zu organisieren] (1956, p. 318). Correspondency and dispersion are not geometrical projective proportions but are dynamical results (p. 389). It is as if the one image with and in depth forces the binocular images to fuse according to the laws of the imaged object in its own spatial field.
Having demonstrated his mastery of experimentation, and his understanding that perceptual phenomena are not to be explained completely by reference to either the optical properties of the physical stimulus or the physiological properties of the perceiver, Linschoten moves to the theoretical implications of his work.   The third, theoretical, division formulates the dynamic theory of depth perception.  It is nevertheless 156 pages long and contains four chapters​[12]​. In these chapters Linschoten demonstrates his theoretical competence, meaning the competence to discuss and analyze the implications of experiments, hypotheses, theory and postulates at levels ranging from the philosophical to the mathematical, and from theory to predictions in experiments.  The conclusion is, first, anti-reductionistic and anti-mechanistic, and a strong argument for an autonomous psychology. Phenomenology is not used as a psychological method. It is the basis of the check on whether the claims for explanations of perception can be held at all. The fact that he used depth perception as the field on which to focus is—interesting and important though it is—merely a matter of example.  Linschoten’s thesis remains a contemporary work although much has been added to the field in recent years—both psychologically as well as physiologically and anatomically.  The thesis constitutes a central part of Linschoten’s work and approach and should be considered in relation to his other works, particularly when considering the question of his rejection of phenomenology.
Linschoten on William James
Linschoten further cemented his reputation, however, as a phenomenological psychologist with the publication of his book on William James, first published in Dutch in the Netherlands in 1959, in German in 1961, and much later in English, by Duquesne University Press, in 1968.  Based on a year of lectures that he gave in 1957 and 1958, it is more than interesting that he focused on an American philosopher and psychologist and tried to cast James as a fore-runner of phenomenology, albeit one who was simply unaware of the work being done simultaneously by Husserl.  He saw in James a “doctrine of experience of the body that in many essential points was [the] anticipation of phenomenological psychology. . .  James was on the way to a phenomenological psychology” (Linschoten, 1968, pp. 308-309).  Here too Linschoten is not developing a unique phenomenological psychology so much as he is trying to integrate phenomenology into an extant position.  
It is important to note Linschoten’s conclusion on the question of what kind of psychology James was proposing,  “We would … do [James] an injustice if we did not add that he was ahead of [a phenomenological psychology] with respect to a central point: namely his integration of an objectivating psychology within the frame of reference of a descriptive psychology” (p. 309).  Once again Linschoten refuses to decide between an experimental, objective psychology and the phenomenological psychology of which it is a part or perhaps a prerequisite.  In one sense the volume on James is a way for Linschoten to work through the problem of how he can integrate phenomenology with empirical psychology.  While James’s methodological pluralism is, on the one hand, frustrating for Linschoten, on the other it leads him to read James as proposing two viewpoints.  One is an intentional description and analysis of experience and the body, the other is a description and analysis of experience and body in “the time-space context of experienced reality” (p. 312).  The former produces a “descriptive psychology,” and the latter an “explanatory psychology,” but “if the two are divorced, then there arises a ‘mental science’ psychology and a ‘natural science’ psychology; and these two, because they absolutize their individual viewpoints, no longer understand one another and seem to exclude one another” (p. 312).  Hence by the late 1950s, after achieving the chair in psychology at Utrecht University, Linschoten had come to a clear position that refused to separate and critique an objective, empirical psychology from a descriptive, phenomenological psychology. In phenomenology of course, this distinction is also false; objectivity is constituted through intentional acts on Husserl’s account although Husserl’s work predating that of his last work (The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology; (Husserl, 1954 (1970)) is often characterized as idealist on this score.
Linschoten in the early 1960s
Linschoten appeared to expend some effort in the early 1960s to develop a reputation in the United States.  In 1961 he received an invitation from Duquesne University to teach in the Department of Psychology for a term. Linschoten taught a course in “General Experimental Psychology” and in “Contemporary Schools of Psychology,” presumably a seminar on phenomenological research (D. L. Smith, 1983).   His time there however was disappointing and cut short by the fact that he had his second heart attack in Philadelphia on April 7, 1961.  In a letter from his hospital bed to his publisher, Joost Bommeljé, Linschoten referred to the United States as a land of “unfulfilled promises and wasted futures”.  Nevertheless, it also seemed to strengthen his resolve to carry on in experimental psychology.  When he returned to the Netherlands in 1963 he published a paper wherein he is critical of a certain interpretation of phenomenology for its unproductive approach when compared to the reductive models of science. He once again notes that there is no competition between phenomenology and an objective psychology.  The latter is a reductive psychology and does not address the complete reality that is described by phenomenology.  At the same time Linschoten was giving the lectures that would be the basis for his last book, Idolen, wherein he was to be more forceful (and personal) in his critique of phenomenology (Linschoten, 1964). The 1963 paper was his last on phenomenology.
In Idolen, Linschoten argued that because psychologists are persons too, they are very unreliable instruments for coming to know the “innerness” (“innerlijkheid”) or uniqueness of people in a way that was special or scientific.  One way of approaching this volume is to see it as one long argument for the unreliability of human beings as ‘measuring devices’ and the necessity to use the tools that science can provide to extend our capacities of judgment and evaluation.  This is illustrated along the way with numerous cases and problems and hence develops its argument in such a way that it gradually covers examples of most of psychology’s major subfields.  In short, psychologists share all of the intuitions and habits of ordinary life, the sensus communis,  so that when they investigate psychological phenomena, they are at once the object of the investigation and the means of inquiry.​[13]​  Linschoten saw the intuitions and habits of psychologists as versions of Francis Bacon’s four “Idols of the Mind” (Bacon, 1620/1899).​[14]​ They needed to be cleared out of the way of scientific research, especially in psychology. Linschoten reserves a place for phenomenological psychology, but only to provide critical reflection on the world of daily affairs, not to provide answers to scientific psychological questions.  The sensus communis, the ordinary world, is uncritical, short-sighted and often contradictory.  It is these opinions, which make up the sensus communis, that are the idols of the psychologist. 
At the conclusion of his book, Linschoten argues that “it is the task of psychology to clarify and predict human behavior with the assistance of formal models, to verify the correctness of the model through experimental tests so that, in so far as the sensus communis allows, to demonstrate the acquired knowledge in the control of human behavior”  (p. 415).  Indeed, Linschoten goes so far as to say at the conclusion of his book that the essence of humanity is “in the 46 chromosomes of homo sapiens” (1964, p. 373).  On the face of it this surely looks like a repudiation of phenomenological psychology, even the more modest version that Linschoten espoused in the late 1950s and 1960s.  In addition, the volume is redolent with critiques of a host of phenomenological psychologists. Most of the members of the Utrecht School come in for subtle or not so subtle critique, including Buytendijk himself.  It was not difficult to ascribe a radical turn to Linschoten at this, the very end of his life.
	Without Linschoten it is likely that the downfall of phenomenological psychology would have come in any case, as in most European countries.​[15]​  Indeed a number of commentators have dated the end of phenomenological psychology in the Netherlands to 1957, the year in which Buytendijk retired from Utrecht University.  Hence in one sense Linschoten was merely reflecting the changes already making themselves felt in European higher education.  By 1955, argued Van Strien, Dutch psychologists were more likely to cite English references than German references in their research articles.  The post-war movement towards American psychology was possible only in the context of a broader change in views of human nature and culture (Van Strien, 1993, p. 164).  The Marshall-plan along with the Fullbright exchange program meant that many Dutch academics were able to visit the United States, while American films, literature and popular culture became widely available.  It is not surprising, then, that Dutch psychologists (along with scientists in general) gradually oriented themselves to the English speaking world.  And as Dehue (1995) has noted, there were a number of competing psychologies vying for domination during the post-war period. 
In addition, the personalism of the phenomenology of Buytendijk and Van Lennep was viewed as patronizing and reflective of a pre-war morality.  Furthermore, the gentlemen’s club that the phenomenologists seemed to inspire was seen as elitist and undemocratic, values that were widely attacked in the 1960s as the universities rapidly grew.   From this vantage point it is clear that Linschoten was reacting not only to phenomenology but to the implicit politicization and elitism of phenomenological psychology.  What American psychology offered was not only the rhetoric of a neutral scientific psychology, but also the promise of a thoroughly democratic psychology.  What better way to undermine the tradition of the Utrecht School than to do so in the name of what appears to be a radically democratic impulse, one that downplays “innerness” for phenomena observable by anyone.  As Linschoten himself observed numerous times in Idols, the psychologist is not above the lay person in making judgments about human nature, it is only when those judgments are supported by the evidence of science that one can have any confidence in the claims of the psychologist. 
International movement, and the transplantation of phenomenological psychology.
By 1960 the interest in phenomenology and the volume of publications on the subject was on the increase. Some publications that originally appeared in German, Dutch or French were translated into English (e.g. Buytendijk, 1967; Strasser, 1977), although a number of the more important European ones became available only much later (e.g.Kockelmans, 1987).   Many of the influential titles published after 1960 (Elkin, 1970; Giorgi, 1965; 1966, 1968, 1970a, 1970b, 1975; Kwant, 1963; Luijpen, 1960; Strasser, 1963; Straus, 1965; Van Kaam, 1966; von Eckartsberg, 1972) came from Duquesne University, either because Duquesne University Press was involved as the publisher, or because the authors or translators were affiliated with Duquesne. This university also hosted the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology (volume 1 appeared in 1970, edited by Amedeo Giorgi).  The psychology department at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh had become a center for the new psychology and Dutch psychologists and philosophers were regular visitors.  Adrian van Kaam, another Dutch psychologist and Catholic priest, who came to Duquesne University in 1954 and later founded the “Institute of Man” there, wrote a widely read book entitled The existential foundations of psychology (Van Kaam, 1966). In the late 1950s, after completing a Ph.D. at Case Western Reserve University in 1958 and having spent time with Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, Van Kaam gradually introduced a unique existential-phenomenological graduate program at Duquesne (see D. L. Smith, 1983, 2002).  Amedeo Giorgi was one of the teachers at Duquesne involved in the dissemination of (Dutch) phenomenology. After Linschoten’s death, Giorgi (1965; 1966) articulated a version of phenomenological psychology that, unlike Linschoten’s, strongly distinguished between (positivist) experimental and phenomenological psychology.  For Giorgi (1965), the importance of existential phenomenological thought had been amply demonstrated for the realms of clinical psychology, psychopathology, psychoanalysis and personality theory. 
So in the mid-sixties the phenomenological tradition in psychology was one of the few psychological traditions to have had any impact on psychology outside of the Netherlands itself. However, just as that impact was beginning to be felt, Dutch psychologists themselves appeared to reject phenomenological psychology.

Conclusion
Although Linschoten died much too soon, his influence on psychology was palpable. In Germany his Ph.D. Thesis was influential among perception psychologists. In North America he was known for his book on James among phenomenological psychologists. In the Netherlands his influence was most pervasive. He first articulated a subtle view of phenomenology – perhaps too subtle for most readers to appreciate – and then articulated the new wave in psychology that is often interpreted as positivistic and experimentalist in opposition to phenomenological psychology. We have tried to argue that his position was much more sophisticated. Linschoten appears to have understood that most psychologists had come to believe that he was a true phenomenological psychologist. He may have deliberately tried to  overstate his case against this perception in his Fenomenologie en Psychologie (Linschoten, 1962), where he addressed his audience frankly, stating that “[he was] less than some years before prepared to defend a radical phenomenological design of psychology. One of the reasons for that is the fruitfulness of reductive models in positivistic fashion. [For it is] in the positivistic design that psychology recently has been successful” (1962, p. 113). His argument resembles many of the arguments in Idolen (not surprisingly, of course). In fact he admits the phenomenologist uses words, and words cannot help but be reductions of full reality. So why not use formulas and experimental procedures that reduce the same full reality in another way. Therefore phenomenology within psychology is no better, and no worse, than models, quantification and experimentation. 
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^1	  Several of the members of the ‘Utrecht School’ were heavily influenced by the work of Max Scheler and the notion of “personalism” (not to be confused with the American version of ‘personalism’ such as that of Borden Browne (e.g. (Knudson, 1927).  Scheler was influential apparently in convincing Buytendijk to convert to Catholicism and was significant as well to other members of the school.  His general importance to post-war European Catholic intellectual life can be seen through his intellectual influence on the late pope (e.g., (Wojtyla, 1979). Scheler argued, among other things, for the objective existence of values, a position that sat well with the nascent phenomenological psychology in Utrecht.  It is important to note that Linschoten appears not to have been notably influenced by personalism.  Personalism was also  far removed from the traditional phenomenology of Husserl.
^2	  Breeuwsma’s comment is made in the context of a debate with Hofstee on the nature of narrative psychology.  In response to Hofstee’s use of Linschoten, Breeuwsma counters that Linschoten’s ‘bible’ is brought to bear on arguments whenever a psychologist wishes to appear ‘broad-shouldered,’ that is, hard-nosed and scientific.
^3	  A third possible although lesser known version of Linschoten exists in German speaking countries. Here he was often known as the Dutch experimental psychologist of depth perception who published an important work in 1956.  We will not discuss this reception of Linschoten save to address the 1956 work itself although it is important to note that Carl Graumann, who was at the University of Bonn while Linschoten was alive and later moved to the University of Heidelberg, was befriended with Linschoten and shared his more phenomenological ambitions for psychology (e.g., (Graumann, 1956).
^4	  Linschoten’s parents were not Catholic but appear to have had a variety of mystical interests.  Linschoten himself converted from the ‘Old Catholic’ church to Roman Catholicism.  A number of people who knew him wondered if his conversion was motivated by Buytendijk’s Catholicism or his desire to marry Ans Doeke who came from a staunch Catholic family.
^5	  Linschoten’s literary legacy includes unpublished lectures, talks, papers, as well as published newspaper articles, articles for student journals and popular magazines, even brochures “for the catholic family” ,  radio talks and poetry (sometimes signed by a pseudonym Johannes Vreede).  In addition, there are, of course, academic books and articles, and pages of handwritten material that consisted of unfinished projects. The academic production can be categorized in a limited number of ways. One is work in which he gives a phenomenological analysis of a certain phenomenon, e.g. falling asleep (Linschoten, 1955, 1956b; 1987a; 1987b). Other work is of a more philosophical nature, most often about the relation of phenomenology to psychology. This has two subcategories that can be distinguished but that only differ in the degree of explicitness of accepting phenomenology as an approach within psychology (if not as the phenomenological method in psychology) versus—often later in his publishing career—as phenomenology outside psychology, that is as phenomenology having the Husserlian foundational role for psychology. His Idolen can be seen as one extreme of this latter argument, his early publications follow the former. Nevertheless, nowhere, not even in the earliest works, will one find an explicit refutation of empiricism per se.
^6	  There is only one reference in the thesis to Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, on page 418, where in a footnote he claims that it is to be regretted that Gestalt theory has neglected Husserl’s phenomenological investigations.
^7	  ‘Glass experience’ refers to the phenomenon of being able to see through, but not walk through, glass. It is opposed to the phenomenon of, for example, walking through fog that one cannot see through.
^8	  The Panum Effect is the effect whereby looking through a stereoscope (or focussing beyond the picture) at a single straight line a on the left and two straight lines b’and c’ on the right, the experience will be of two lines a and c’ (in which b’ apparently has joined a). See figure 1.				INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
^9	  E.P. Köster, one of his students in the early fifties, reports that he assisted Linschoten in experiments 121 and 122. In these experiments he worked with 10-12 participants – students that were not familiar with the theory at stake (E.P. Köster in an e-mail communication with the first author of 19-10-2006). 
^10	  We thank Amedeo Giorgi for noting the generality of this way of proceeding, that is until the demonstrator obtains the effect desired.  However, we have continued to use the label Linschoten used (“experiments”) to describe his studies, to distinguish them from mere demonstrations.
^11	  <a,a’> means that lines a and a’ are seen as one line.
^12	  Chapter eight discusses a dynamic theory of depth localization, chapter nine confronts Herings theory and the attraction theory with sense physiological facts, and chapter ten looks at the dynamical explanation of the Gestalt theory of depth perception at the psychophysical level.
^13	  This is a version of an older criticism of the very possibility of a scientific psychology that originates with Kant and is premised on the notion of mind as transcendental.
^14	  Bacon called these the idols of the tribe, the idols of the cave, the idols of the market place and the idols of the theater.  They were seen as impediments to true knowledge.
^15	  This is a complicated history because there are many versions of ‘phenomenology’ at stake.  The version that ended in mid-twentieth century Europe was that version that attempted to integrate the work of an objective, empirical psychology with the understanding of a phenomenal experience that preceded all attempts at explanation.  Other versions of phenomenological psychology would go on to survive in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Belgium, Scandinavian countries).   
